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The thermal, mechanical, and neutronic performance of the metal alloy fast reactor fuel
design complements the safety advantages of the liquid metal cooling and the pool-type
primary system. Together, these features provide large safety margins in both normal
operating modes and for a wide range of postulated accidents. In particular, they maximize
the measures of safety associated with inherent reactor response to unprotected, double-
fault accidents, and to minimize risk to the public and plant investment. High thermal
conductivity and high gap conductance play the most significant role in safety advantages
of the metallic fuel, resulting in a flatter radial temperature profile within the pin andmuch
lower normal operation and transient temperatures in comparison to oxide fuel. Despite
the big difference in melting point, both oxide and metal fuels have a relatively similar
margin to melting during postulated accidents. When the metal fuel cladding fails, it
typically occurs below the coolant boiling point and the damaged fuel pins remain cool-
able. Metal fuel is compatible with sodium coolant, eliminating the potential of energetic
fuelecoolant reactions and flow blockages. All these, and the low retained heat leading to a
longer grace period for operator action, are significant contributing factors to the inher-
ently benign response of metallic fuel to postulated accidents. This paper summarizes the
past analytical and experimental results obtained in past sodium-cooled fast reactor safety
programs in the United States, and presents an overview of fuel safety performance as
observed in laboratory and in-pile tests.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Next-generation nuclear energy systems currently under
consideration aim for significant advances over light waterd under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behareactors (LWRs) in the areas of sustainability, economics,
safety, reliability, and nonproliferation. Development of these
systems is an international effort, involving collaborations
under the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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Forum [1] and the International Atomic Energy Agency's In-
ternational Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel
Cycles [2]. Studies under these programs highlight importance
of the closed fuel cycle systems using fast-neutron reactors to
meet especially the sustainability goal through efficient
resource utilization.
The current path relying heavily on LWRs in a “once-
through” fuel cycle is not sustainable. The LWRs extract en-
ergy from only a small fraction of the natural uranium in the
fuel. Used LWR fuel contains more than 95% of the original
uranium, as well as heavier elements that are usable as fuel.
By comparison, fast reactors can extract about 2 orders of
magnitude more energy from the same amount of fuel. The
once-through fuel cyclewith no provision for recycling of used
fuel also places a heavy burden on the spent fuel repository
storage capacity. In a fast reactor with a closed fuel cycle, the
transuranic elements that remain radioactive for a long time
can be consumed, significantly reducing the time horizon and
repository space needed for waste isolation.
Although reconsidered as part of the next-generation nu-
clear reactors, the fast-spectrum systems, particularly the
liquid sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), are not new concepts.
Since the 1950s, SFR technologies have been pursued and
demonstrated worldwide, leading to the construction and
operation of several experimental and prototype fast reactors
in the United States [U.S.; Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-I
and -II, FERMI, and Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF)], Soviet Union
(BR-10, BOR-60, BN-350, and -600), UK (DFR and PFR), France
(RAPSODIE, Phenix, and Superphenix), Germany (KNK and
SNR-300), and Japan (JOYO and Monju). These fast reactors
have achieved ~400 reactor-years of accumulated operation
experience. There is again a renewed interest in SFRs with the
restart of Monju in Japan, completion of CEFR in China, PFBR in
India, and BN-800 in Russia, and recent design efforts for PGSFR
in South Korea, ASTRID in France, and BN-1200 in Russia.2. SFR designs and their impact on safety
Fast reactor concepts are typically classified by their coolant:
(1) SFRs, (2) lead (or leadebismuth eutectic)-cooled fast re-
actors, and (3) gas-cooled fast reactors. All three concepts
share some basic principles. They do not need neutron mod-
erators (water or graphite), resulting in a “fast” (or “hard”)
neutron energy spectrum compared to “thermal reactors”
(LWRs and HTGRs). They take advantage of the larger fission-
to-capture cross-section ratio and the greater number of
neutrons released from the fission reaction at high energies
for improved neutron economy, allowing greater flexibility of
material selection (such as stainless steel for cladding and
structures). The fast spectrum leads to an order of magnitude
longer neutron mean-free path, resulting in a much greater
sensitivity to neutron leakage and minor changes in core ge-
ometry. Negligible spatial self-shielding due to longer mean-
free path also implies that reactivity perturbations impact
the core as a whole, not just locally. The fast neutron spec-
trum can be used for breeding and transmutation of trans-
uranic waste products, allowing a long core life in “breed-and-
burn” concepts.Among the three fast reactor concepts, SFRs are by far the
most common type. Their main characteristics include a high
core outlet temperature (typically > 500C) leading to a greater
thermal efficiency (~40%) for energy conversion; ability to use
electromagnetic pumps (with no moving parts) and electro-
magnetic flow instrumentation; high core power density (~5
times greater in comparison to an LWR); and an intermediate
heat transport system that separates the activated coolant in
the primary heat transport system from the balance of the
plant. They can be configured either as a loop type (with the
primary coolant pumped out of the reactor vessel into the
intermediate heat exchanger located inside the containment)
or a pool-type system (with the primary coolant kept within a
larger reactor vessel that encompasses the core, intermediate
heat exchanger, and coolant pumps). In both the loop and
pool-type systems, a guard vessel surrounds the reactor vessel
as a secondary barrier against primary sodium leakage.
In an LWR, water acts as both a coolant and a moderator
with an optimal pitch/diameter (P/D) ratio that provides suf-
ficient cooling capability while allowing neutrons to slow
down to “thermal” energies through collisions with hydrogen
and oxygen atoms. In an SFR with no neutron moderation,
sodium acts only as a coolant. Because of the excellent heat
transfer properties of sodium coolant (or liquid metals in
general), fuel pins can be packed much tighter in a hexagonal
lattice (triangular pitch), typically separated only by a thin
wire spirally wrapped around each fuel pin to prevent pin-to-
pin contact.
The safety advantages of SFRs include low-pressure pri-
mary and intermediate coolant systems; liquidemetal sodium
coolant with about 2 orders of magnitude more effective heat
transfer medium compared to water; wide margin to boiling
(~400C during normal operation); inherent safety with “net”
negative reactivity feedback during accidents that lead to
elevated core/coolant temperatures; dedicated systems for
emergency decay heat removal to an ultimate heat sink;
simpler operation and accident management providing a long
grace period for corrective action, if needed.
The low-pressure primary and intermediate heat transport
systems eliminate the LOCA concern and the need for high-
pressure coolant injection systems. Instead, the SFR designs
typically include a guard vessel (and guard pipes in a loop type
system) to “maintain” the primary coolant inventory. Low
pressure in the primary heat transport system also results in
low design pressure for the containment, mostly against heat
from potential sodium fires. The large coolant temperature
increase during flow through the reactor core (150C in an SFR
vs. ~30C in an LWR) and the large thermal expansion coeffi-
cient of liquid sodium facilitate reliance on completely passive
systems (driven only by natural circulation) for decay heat
removal.
However, the SFRs also pose unique design challenges. Fast
reactor cores are not in their most reactive configuration and,
consequently, the design must ensure that a recriticality does
not occur during a postulated accident that could lead to fuel
failures. For designs with larger cores, sodium void worth can
be positive resulting in a reactivity addition if the temperature
of the sodium coolant reaches its boiling point during postu-
lated accidents. The liquid sodium coolant also reacts with air
and water, and ablates concrete: avoiding the impact of such
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tant to safetymotivates reliance on leak-tight coolant systems,
inert cells, guard pipes, and steel liner over concrete surfaces.Fig. 1 e The full-length metallic Experimental Breeder
Reactor (EBR)-II fuel in casting furnace (top) and after
casting (bottom).3. SFR fuel types and design challenges
The decision on fuel type can be based on many criteria
including its irradiation performance, fabrication, safety, and
fuel cycle implications. Common SFR fuel types include oxide,
metal alloy, nitride, and carbide fuels, but large irradiation
and safety testing experience exists only for oxide and
metallic fuels. The original choice for fast reactors was high-
density metal fuel to facilitate breeding. The earliest fast re-
actors including EBR-I (which generated first usable nuclear
electricity in 1951), EBR-II (1963), Fermi (1963), and DFR in the
UK (1959) all used metal fuel. However, these early designs
achieved only limited fuel burnup because of greater fuel
swelling in fast spectrum. Consequently, the oxide fuel type
was adopted in FFTF and Clinch River Breeder Reactor projects
in the U.S., and the rest of the world followed suit. Subsequent
fuel testing in EBR-II from 1963 to 1994 as part of U.S.
Department of Energy's Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor and
Integral Fast Reactor programs demonstrated that the burnup
limitation could be overcome by allowing adequate space in-
side the pin to accommodate initial fuel swelling.
The oxide fuel is fabricated in the form of uranium- or
mixed-oxide sintered (ceramic) pellets similar in design to an
LWR oxide fuel. The fuel-cladding gap and fission gas plenum
is initially filled with an inert gas. The oxide fuel irradiation
experience comes from the fast reactors in the U.S., France,
Russia, and Japan. The metal fuel is injection cast as binary
(UeZr) or ternary (UePueZr) alloys of full-length slugs in SS
(316) or advanced alloy (D9, HT9, HT9M) cladding. The gap
between the fuel slug and the cladding is filled with sodium
(often referred to as “bond sodium”) to improve the gap
conductance. The metal fuel also features a larger fission gas
plenum to achieve high burnup. The metal fuel irradiation
experience comes from irradiation experiments in EBR-II and
FFTF reactors in the U.S.
Greater fuel swelling in the fast spectrum makes the Fuel-
Cladding Mechanical Interaction (FCMI) a challenge especially
for oxide fuel, limiting the burnup that can be achievedwith it.
The metal alloy fuel, by contrast, is prone to fail primarily
because of Fuel-Cladding Chemical Interaction (FCCI).
Because FCCI is a highly temperature-dependent process, it
may limit the coolant outlet temperature of the metallic fuel
core, but it does not impose amajor burnup limit for themetal
alloy fuel forms. Another important consideration between
these two major fast reactor fuel types is the fuelecoolant
compatibility: oxide fuel chemically reacts with the sodium
coolant, imposing stricter limits on fuel pin failures to prevent
potential flow blockages as a result of it.
Despite these differences, sufficient irradiation and safety
testing experience exists with both oxide and metal fuel types,
justifying their selection as the fuel for an SFR design. Bothwith
oxide andmetallic fuels, acceptable performance and reliability
has been demonstrated up to 10% burnup, with capability
demonstrated up to 20% burnup. This is in contrast to a fewpercent typically achieved in an LWR. Robustness of oxide fuels
against over-power transients up to four times the nominal
power has also been demonstrated in Transient Reactor Test
Facility (TREAT) tests (well above typical primary and secondary
safety system trip settings), indicating that typical performance
issues are FCMI-induced creep rupture of cladding at high
burnup, with failures occurring usually around the core mid-
plane. Robust over-power capability of metallic fuel has been
demonstrated in TREAT tests for up to five times the nominal
power, with the failures occurring near the top of the fuel col-
umn due to accelerated FCCI. For metallic fuels, the perfor-
mance and phenomena with the various alloy forms (UeFs,
UeZr, and UePueZr) are found to be similar, with burnup,
temperature, and cladding type being the key differentiators.3.1. Metal alloy fuel design
The metallic fuels are developed at Argonne based on expe-
rience gained through 20þ years operation of EBR-II reactors
and additional irradiation experiments in FFTF reactors [3].
Metal fuel is injection cast as full-length cylindrical slugs as
shown in Fig. 1. The EBR-II fuel pin design is also shown in
Fig. 2. Early experience with trying to restrain swelling of the
metal fuel with strong cladding was not successful, and it
limited the burnup that can be achieved with it. The key to
overcome this limitation was the discovery that, although its
soft structure allows metal alloy fuel to swell easily, the total
swelling is limited to the swelling at only a fewpercent burnup
Fig. 2 e The metal alloy fuel design used in Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II reactor. Note. From “Performance of
metallic fuels and blankets in liquidemetal fast breeder reactors,” by L.C. Walters, B.R. Seidel, and J.H. Kittel, 1984, Nuclear
Technology, 65, p. 179e231. Copyright 20XX, Copyright Holder. Reprinted with permission.
Fig. 3 e Axial and radial fuel swelling in variousmetal alloy
fuels as a function of peak burnup.
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interconnection of pores in the fuel matrix allows venting of
fission gas to the pin plenum avoiding further swelling.
Therefore, by allowing sufficient room inside the cladding to
accommodate this initial swelling, the FCMI limitation to
achieve higher burnup was eliminated for the metal fuel
forms.
Multiple iterations of metal fuel designs have evolved
throughout the history of the various U.S. research, devel-
opment, and demonstration programs. Initial metal fuel de-
signs in the 1960s used unalloyed uranium or plutonium
driver fuels with relatively high smear densities (the areal
density of as-fabricated fuel within as-fabricated cladding).
Early discovery of challenges associated with the fabrication
and utilization of unalloyed fuel, however, led to the testing
of various alloys in metal fuel to increase its mechanical
strength, improve its chemical stability, and raise the liq-
uidus/solidus temperatures. The first EBR-II driver fuel was
the Ue5Fs alloy. The fissium (Fs) was a composition of
simulated noble metal fission products expected to result
from the EBR-II fuel recycling process. By 1970, zirconium
gained favor as a better metal fuel alloy, and it replaced Fs for
use in EBR-II driver fuel. The FCCI was a significant contrib-
utor to fuel life reduction resulting from clad thinning owing
to the formation of a low-melting point eutectic, and the use
of zirconium significantly reduced the interdiffusion of fuel
and clad components [4].Although the second and third iterations of EBR-II driver
fuel still utilized the fissium and Zr alloys, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy's Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program
eventually selected ternary UePueZr alloy as reference fuel in
Table 1eA comparison ofmetal and oxide fuel properties
and thermal characteristics.
Metal
(Ue20Pue10Zr)
Oxide
(UO2e20PuO2)
Heavy metal density
(g/cm3)
14.1 9.3
Melting temperature (K) 1,400 3,000
Thermal conductivity
(W/cm K)
0.16 0.023
Operating centerline
temperature at
40 kW/m (K)
1,060 2,360
T/Tmelt 0.76 0.79
Fuel-cladding solidus (K) 1,000
(eutectic limit)
1,675
Thermal expansion (1/K) 17  106 12  106
Heat capacity (J/g K) 0.17 0.34
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zirconium is still considered one of the most promising SFR
metal fuel options, and is typically used as the reference fuel
in most mature SFR designs in the U. S. and South Korea. The
operating experience with metal fuel is quite substantial, and
a comprehensive analysis of fast reactor fuel experience [4]
suggests that the existing metal fuel database is sufficient to
make a safety case for use of metal fuel in a demonstration or
prototype facility, provided that the fuel composition and
burnup are expected to be within the envelope of the available
database.
3.2. Comparison of irradiated metal and oxide fuel
behavior
The metallic fuel form offers some favorable neutronics
properties. Specifically, the absence of oxygen atoms in the
fuel leads to a harder neutron spectrum, increasing the
neutron production per neutron absorbed in the pin. This
occurs both because of the higher average number of neutrons
emitted per neutron absorbed, and because of the enhanced
fast fission in U238. The combined effect increases the number
of neutrons available for breeding and parasitic losses by ~20%
in comparison to oxide systems.Moreover, the effective heavy
metal density is higher in the metallic fuel relative to the
traditional oxide fuel. For example, in an internal blanket as-
sembly with 50% fuel volume fraction, Ue10% Zrmetallic pins
at 85% smear density provide 35% more U238 atoms than do
UO2 pellets at 93% smear density. Both of these characteristics
can be used to increase the core internal conversion ratio and
achieve smaller burnup swing in longer refueling cycles.
A comparison of oxide and metal fuel physical properties
and thermal characteristics are given in Table 1. For oxide fuel,
performance and failure modes depend on various irradiation
effects: (1) fuel restructuring and grain growth affect the fission
gas release and fuel creep characteristics; (2) as-fabricated
porosity migration is responsible for the formation of the
central cavity and it affects fuel thermal conductivity; (3)
fission gas retention and release affect the radial distribution
of total porosity and fission gas bubble induced fuel swelling;
(4) fission product swelling includes solid fission product and
fission gas bubble swelling, and it affects the radial porosity
profile and fuel dimensions; (5) fuel-cladding gap condition
affects the fuel temperatures; and (6) irradiation-induced
cladding swelling affects the cladding dimensions and density.
For transients leading to oxide fuel pin failure, the failure
modes and extent of fuel disruption depend on many factors
such as the fuel burnup, fuel and cladding temperatures, fuel
melt fraction, molten cavity pressure, and the cladding stress.
The failuremodes include the plastic straining of the cladding
due to internal fission gas pressure and differential expansion
between the fuel and cladding, and the cladding melting due
to excessive temperatures. The cladding failures result in not
only the release of fission products to the primary coolant, but
they could also lead to coolant channel blockages and prop-
agation of core damage.
The important phenomena that occur during irradiation of
metal alloy fuels are thermal expansion of fuel and cladding,
fuel constituent radial migration, fission gas behavior,
porosity formation and distribution, irradiation-inducedradial and axial swelling of fuel due to solid fission products
and fission gas, bond sodium migration into fuel and pin
plenum, and cladding constituent migration into the fuel. As
the fission gas is generated inside the metal fuel pin, it is
retained within grains, in grain boundary bubbles, and in
fission gas plenum above the fuel slug. The full spectrum of
phenomena involved in metal fuel irradiation is summarized
in Fig. 4.
Postirradiation examination of metallic UePueZr fuel pins
shows the formation of annular zones with considerably
different alloy compositions, fuel porosities, and densities as
shown in Fig. 5. Uraniummigrates from the central and outer
zones to the middle zone, whereas Zr and fission products
tend to migrate in opposite directions. The resulting zonal
densities can vary from 8 g/mL in the central zone to 16 g/mL
in the middle zone. The Zr depletion in the middle zone also
reduces the melting temperature significantly and impacts
the thermophysical properties.
As the steady-state irradiation proceeds, fission gas is
initially retained in the metal fuel matrix. Grain boundary
bubbles form, producing early fuel swelling. At burnup levels
higher than a few percent, the grain boundary bubbles get
interlinked, opening up a path for release of fission gas to the
pin plenum. As a result, fission gas-driven swelling, thus the
cladding stress due to FCMI, stays limited. Although the
cladding stress owing to internal fission gas pressure con-
tinues to increase with burnup, it remains as only a small
fraction of the stress from FCMI in oxide fuels.
By contrast, uranium in metallic fuels interacts chemically
with iron-based cladding to form a low-melting-point eutectic
alloy. In equilibrium, the liquid eutectic phase has been
observed at a temperature as low as 1,000 K for an alloy that is
89% uranium. This liquefied region at the fuel/cladding
interface is formed only if the fuel slug is in contact with the
cladding, the contact temperature is sufficient to cause
eutectic alloy formation, and the temperature remains
elevated long enough to sustain the eutectic formation. The
primary importance of the eutectic formation is the thinning
of the cladding, reducing its ability to contain the internal pin
pressure from the accumulated fission gas. Although a very
slow process at low temperatures, eutectic formation can lead
to accelerated cladding failure at elevated temperatures.
Fig. 4 e Phenomena involved in metal fuel irradiation [18].
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The enhanced safety focus of the SFR designs aims for reliance
on inherent processes to provide favorable neutronic feedback
and passive systems for reactor cooling in response to acci-
dent initiators. The idea is to take advantage of the intrinsic
design characteristics to maintain the balance between
reactor cooling capability and power production and to pre-
vent fuel failures in instances when engineered safety sys-
tems fail. These response characteristics are heavily
influenced by the choice of reactor materials, most impor-
tantly the fuel. Performance of metallic fuel in normal and
accident situations is a direct result of its favorable thermal,
mechanical, and neutronic properties. As explained below,
these properties assure optimal safety response in design
basis accidents, anticipated transients without scram, and
severe accidents, as well as in normal operation where local
faults can contribute to cladding failures.Fig. 5 e Postirradiation examination of metallic UePueZr fuel pi
zones due to constituent migration.4.1. Thermomechanical and neutronic safety aspects of
metal fuel
Many of the safety performance characteristics of the binary
and ternary metal alloy fuel designs can be traced to their
thermal and mechanical properties, with the most impor-
tant of these being the high thermal conductivity. At oper-
ating temperatures, a typical fresh fuel has a thermal
conductivity of ~0.16 W/cm K, almost an order of magnitude
greater than oxide fuel. This means a much lower radial
temperature rise from its outer surface to fuel centerline at
operating conditions (< 200 K). As the fuel is irradiated, it
swells into contact with the cladding, displacing the initial
gap bond sodium and establishing even better fuel cladding
thermal contact. The small temperature gradient across the
fuel radius and the low operating temperature lead to a
correspondingly small zero- to full-power Doppler reactivity
swing, resulting in reduced control reactivity requirementsns at different burnup levels showing formation of annular
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insertion.
The peak operating temperature for metallic fuel is
~1,000 K. This comparatively reduced system heating allows
increased time for operator action to correct flow or cooling
deficiencies. Although the melting temperature for metallic
fuel is relatively low (~1,400 K), the over-power margin to fuel
melting point is approximately the same as the oxide fuel as
shown in Table 1. The phenomena depending on diffusional
rate processes, such as creep and fission gas release, are also
similar for the two fuel types.
Under accident conditions, transient heating of metallic
fuel produces cladding loading dominated by the plenum
pressure. Typically, the larger fission gas plenum inmetal fuel
pins plays a major role in delaying the cladding failures
because it limits the internal pin pressure during postulated
accidents. The similarity of the fuel and the cladding thermal
expansion, and the compliance of the porous and soft fuel
matrix lead to negligible FCMI-induced cladding damage.
Although the FCMI stresses the cladding early in the transient,
little or no plastic strain accumulates before the fuel creep
relaxes the cladding load to a state that follows only the in-
crease in pin plenum pressure.
If an accident sequence proceeds to fuel melting, the high
fuel porosity, low gas retention, and small fuel density
decrease during melting help avoid overpressurization of the
pin.Whenmelting at the top of the fuel column allowsmolten
fuel to expand into the plenum region, in addition to delaying
the fuel failure (as demonstrated during the TREAT over-
power transient tests), this in-pin molten fuel extrusion into
pin plenum can provide a significant source of negative
reactivity feedback.
Metallic fuels interact metallurgically with iron-based
cladding materials, making FCCI the dominant failure mode.
During normal operations, the rate of solid-state interdiffu-
sion is no greater than the wastage in ceramic oxide fuel pins
due to fission product attack of the inner cladding wall. At
elevated temperatures, however, cladding penetration by
liquid fuel-cladding eutectic becomes a major contributor to
cladding failure. The low melting point eutectic weakens the
cladding by thinning the wall, but the small pin pressure ex-
pected during anticipated operational occurrences and most
design basis accidents limits the impact.
The harder neutron spectrum with the metallic fuel form
has two important effects on reactivity feedback coefficients.
The negative Doppler reactivity coefficient is reduced by about
a third relative to oxide systems. The positive sodium density
coefficient also becomes more positive by about a third.
Because the radial temperature gradient is smaller, however,
the component of the power coefficient vested in the coolant
temperature rise is larger than what is vested in the fuel
temperature rise for metal fuel. This partitioning of the power
coefficient components (which is opposite to that of oxide
fuel) contributes to the favorable inherent response attainable
in an SFR with metal fuel. During the anticipated transients
without scram, the smaller Doppler feedback with metal fuel
also permits other naturally occurring negative reactivity
feedbacks, such as axial and radial core thermal expansion, to
overcome the positive Doppler component at reduced tem-
peratures, resulting in self-adjustment of the reactor corepower to match the available decay heat removal capacity as
explained below.
4.2. Response of metal fuel to design basis events and
anticipated transients without scram
The design basis events have routinely been evaluated for the
metal-fueled SFR concepts to demonstrate that the conse-
quences of such events are well within conservatively inter-
preted acceptance guidelines. The passive safety capability of
the pool configuration provides large margins during design
basis accidents. In pool systems, the large primary system
heat capacity buffers the primary system so that no reactor
scram is required for an array of balance-of-plant faults.
In the “Anticipated Transients Without Scram” spectrum,
three specific scenarios serve as quantifiers of safety margins:
(1) unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) accident, in which power
to the coolant pumps is lost; (2) unprotected transient over-
power (UTOP) accident, in which an inserted control rod is
accidentally withdrawn; and (3) unprotected loss-of-heat-sink
(ULOHS) accident, in which feed-water supply to the steam
generators is lost.
For all three scenarios, it is assumed that the plant pro-
tection system fails to insert the control rods. The key to
successful prevention of core disruption under these condi-
tions is to limit the mechanisms leading to reactor damage,
and to promote the mechanisms responding to the upset
condition and acting to restore the reactor power production/
cooling balance.
In all three classes of unprotected accidents, the key to
avoidance of short-term core disruption is to maintain the
coolant outlet temperature below its boiling point. Under
normal operating conditions, the core inlet temperature is
~600e650 K, and the average coolant temperature rise through
the core is ~150 K. To keep the core coolant temperatures
below the sodium boiling point at ~1,200 K, the power-to-flow
ratio must be typically kept below ~4.
In the long term, the net negative reactivity feedback tends
to bring the reactor power into equilibrium with the available
heat rejection rate, and the system approaches an asymptotic
temperature distribution. To avoid core disruption in the long
term, therefore, it is necessary that the peak asymptotic
temperatures in strategic components (reactor vessel, core
support structure, fuel, and cladding) are maintained below
the levels at which creep could cause failures.
Avoidance of both the short- and long-term fuel failures
during the unprotected events depends on; (1) providing suf-
ficient negative reactivity feedback to overcome the power-to-
cooling mismatch and return the system to equilibrium in a
subcritical state and (2) reducing the positive reactivity feed-
back components (such as Doppler feedback) acting to resist
the transition to system equilibrium. In this second respect,
metallic fuel provides better inherent safety performance
than oxide fuel owing to the reduced Doppler reactivity
feedback that turns positive as the system approaches
equilibrium.
For the ULOF accident, the assumed initiator is loss of
power to the primary and intermediate coolant pumps
without scram. As the flow decreases, the core temperature
rises and the expansion of the core radially and axially causes
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As the power falls, the coolant outlet temperature also begins
to decreasewith some delay. For an optimally designedmetal-
fueled pool-type SFR with adequate pump coast-down char-
acteristic, coolant boiling can be avoided with a substantial
margin. With sufficient emergency decay heat removal ca-
pacity, system temperatures should also remain below levels
at which load stress-induced creep could result in structural
failures as the system approaches the equilibrium state.
For the UTOP accident, the assumed initiator is an un-
compensated withdrawal of a single, maximum-worth con-
trol rod. In a metallic-fueled core with a small burnup
reactivity swing, the withdrawal of a single rod should
amount to an insertion of smaller amount of reactivity in
comparison to an oxide-fueled core. In the resulting transient,
the reactor power rises above nominal levels, followed by
heating of the core and coolant that introduces sufficient
negative reactivity to return the reactor power gradually to
equilibrium with the rate of heat rejection. For an optimally
designed metal-fueled pool-type SFR with sufficient decay
heat removal capacity, the low control rod worth results in
manageable overheating of the primary coolant system with
no fuel failures.
For the ULOHS accident, feed-water supply to the steam
generators is lost, yielding a gradual heating of the interme-
diate and primary coolant systems and an increase in the core
inlet temperature. Heating of the core support grid spreads the
core radially, introducing negative reactivity that reduces the
reactor power. In the long term, the reactor power equilibrates
to any available heat sink with the inlet temperature elevated
above the initial state. For an optimally designedmetal-fueled
pool-type SFR with sufficient emergency decay heat removal
capacity, the negative reactivity feedbacks reduce the reactor
power as the core inlet temperature rises, with peak temper-
atures only slightly elevated above nominal conditions.
The unprotected ULOF and ULOHS transients from full
power have been carried out in EBR-II, confirming the capa-
bility of the metal-fueled pool-type SFR concept to respond to
unprotected accidents to avoid any core upset (coolant boiling
or fuel failures) or system damage [6].
4.3. Metal fuel response to local faults
Loss of cladding integrity of a fuel pin during normal steady-
state full-power operation is not expected during the design
lifetime of the fuel. However, stochastic fuel element failures
can be hypothesized owing to the random cladding defects
that could go undetected during the manufacturing process
and inspection, or because of random and localized unfavor-
able neutronics (fuel loading or enrichment errors), thermal,
hydraulic, or mechanical conditions within the fuel assembly.
Such conditions are often referred to as local faults. The
random loss of fuel element cladding integrity can lead to
mass transport, releasing fission gas, bond sodium, and/or
fuel and solid fission products from the fuel element into the
coolant, or permitting ingress of primary sodium into the fuel
element. Local fuel failure implies a failure that is initiated
within a single fuel pin.
Owing to compatibility with sodium, low operating tem-
peratures, predictable irradiation performance, and low FCMI-induced cladding loading, the metallic fuel elements offer a
greater tolerance to local fuel failure events. Although there
may be some limited interaction with trace oxygen in the
coolant, this is significantly different from the chemical re-
action that occurs between oxide fuels and sodium coolant.
The characteristics that give the metal fuel good local fuel
failure performance (both in terms of reduced failure fre-
quency and diminished failure consequences) have been
demonstrated during the run-beyond cladding breach tests in
EBR-II.
Postirradiation examination of fuel pins after run-beyond
cladding breach tests for an oxide and metal fuel pin is
shown in Fig. 6. In these tests, an area of cladding was
machined down to 25e50 mm, leaving < 10% of the original
cladding thickness intact. After a short period of irradiation,
cladding failure occurred at the machined spot for both types
of fuel pins. As metallic fuel is compatible with sodium
coolant, failures due to local faults can be tolerated for an
extended period with propermonitoring of fission gas release.
Themetal fuel shown in Fig. 6 was irradiated for 169 days after
failure (before the PIE was performed), and its posttest ex-
amination indicated no fuel loss into coolant or liquid or solid
fission product escape from fuel pins. By contrast, oxide fuel
chemically reacts with sodium coolant, and local faults can
lead to the formation of reaction products with fuel loss into
coolant and potential fuel coolant channel blockages. There-
fore, oxide-fueled SFR designs require a rigorous fuel failure
detection program.
4.4. Metal fuel response to severe accidents
The possibility of widespread core melting and disruption in
SFRs can be significantly reduced by designing and con-
structing essential equipment to be highly reliable, and by
providing redundant and diverse scram systems. In addition,
because of their unique reactivity feedback characteristics,
metal fueled SFR systems can be designed to avoid core
meltdown under anticipated transient conditions (loss of
flow, loss of heat sink, and transient over-power) even
without scram. Furthermore, because of the low stored energy
in metallic fuel, these systems can survive a sudden and
complete rupture of any part of the core coolant system if a
normal scram is accomplished. The probability of core melt-
down in SFR systems, therefore, can be made exceedingly
small.
Historically, the strategy for demonstrating a low risk of
core disruption in the SFR design concepts during themultiple
failure events has been: (1) to provide reactor design features
to enhance passive safety response and to mitigate the con-
sequences of core disruption accidents, (2) to perform ana-
lyses of accident scenarios with experimentally validated
analysis techniques to quantify margins to core disruption,
and (3) to account for the uncertainties associated with the
frequency of accident initiators and the reliability of passive
safety mechanisms.
Despite all possible design measures taken, a theoretical
possibility of a core disruption (e.g., from a complete and
sudden loss of flow without scram or from complete, long-
term loss of all decay heat removal systems) remains. Work
to date has revealed three characteristics of particular
Fig. 6 e Postirradiation examination of fuel pins after run-beyond cladding breach tests. Left figure is for a metal fuel pin at
12% burnup; right figure is for an oxide fuel pin at 9% burnup.
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scenarios that fall under the “residual-risk” category: (1)
molten metallic fuel have favorable dispersal characteristics
giving rise to a powerful reactivity shutdown mechanism and
(2) resolidified molten metal fuel debris is highly porous,
leading to coolable configurations by natural circulation and
in-vessel retention. The energetic potential of a metal-fueled
SFR meltdown accident is expected to be much more modest
than that of an oxide core.
Because the metal alloy fuel melting point is well below the
cladding melting point, in many cases fuel can be expected to
melt almost entirely before the cladding fails. Once the molten
fuel comes into contact with the cladding, however, it leads to
rapid eutectic penetration and cladding failure. Owing to the
high fuel thermal conductivity, the axial profile of the fuel-
cladding interface temperature closely follows the coolant
temperature profile. Therefore, the FCCI-induced cladding fail-
ures are consistently near the top of the fuel column, where the
coolant and cladding temperatures are the highest. The metal
fuel also firstmeltswell above the coremidplane, facilitating in-
pin molten fuel motion into the fission gas plenum, sometimes
even before the cladding fails. This in-pin molten fuel motion
can be a significant negative reactivity contribution.
When the cladding fails, the internal fission gas pressure
forces the eutectic mix into the coolant channel (again, near
the top of the fuel column) and out above of the core. Because
the eutectic mix temperature is close to the sodium coolant
temperature (and it could be less than the sodium boiling
point in some transients), it does not refreeze or create
blockages, and exits the core upward resulting in a net reac-
tivity loss. The upward motion of the eutectic mix (out of the
active core region) has been demonstrated in transient over-
power tests at TREAT as explained in the next section. A
similar upward motion is also predicted at reduced flow rates
under ULOF conditions because of fission gas expansion, but
there are no tests to validate this prediction yet. As metal fuel
is chemically compatible with the sodium coolant, the phe-
nomenon of eutectic mix entering into the coolant channel is
fairly benign. It does not lead to energetic fuelecoolant re-
actions as oxide fuel does, and the damaged fuel assemblies
remain in a coolable configuration.5. Metal fuel experiments
Laboratory experiments and in-pile tests provide the
phenomenological basis for understanding the metallic fuel
safety performance. The knowledge obtained from these ex-
periments forms the basis for theoretical models used in an-
alyses and, therefore, plays a central role in metallic fuel
safety assessment.5.1. Fuel behavior test apparatus experiments
The Fuel Behavior Test Apparatus (FBTA) experiments tested
the response of short irradiated fuel pin segments to thermal
transients [7,8]. The apparatus had the capability of heating
the segments by direct electrical heating or by external
radiant heating. The FBTA tests were designed to study the
effects of retained fission gas, and the metallurgical interac-
tion of fuel and cladding. External heating was adequate
because the small radial temperature gradients from volu-
metric heating of metallic fuels were not important to the
phenomena studied.
The goal of studying the effects of retained fission gas was
to understand its role in affecting short-term fuel swelling and
fuel column elongation as they relate to fuel integrity and
reactivity feedback. The specific objectives of the test program
were as follows: (1) to assess the amount of fission gas
retained in SFR fuel as a function of fuel structure established
by the original fuel composition, constituent migrations, and
axial location in the fuel rod; (2) to determine themechanisms
influencing fission gas behavior in the fuel with respect to
local fuel swelling and gas release; and (3) to provide empirical
correlations and the mechanistic basis for modeling the ef-
fects of retained fission gas.
The goal of the fuel-cladding compatibility tests was to
develop a reliable predictive capability for the FCCIs in the
timeetemperature regime corresponding to off-normal con-
ditions. The specific objectives of the test program were as
follows: (1) to determine the rate at which irradiated fuel and
cladding interact as functions of time, temperature, and fuel
composition (burnup) and (2) to use these data to determine a
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 2 7e2 3 9236kinetic relationship for such interactions that might lead to a
reduction in fuel life or to severe fuel damage.
5.2. Whole pin furnace tests
The Whole Pin Furnace experimental facility was established
to perform out-of-reactor tests on irradiated intact fuel pins to
determine cladding failure margins during their exposure to
elevated temperatures for up to 24 hours [9,10]. These condi-
tions are typical of the later stages of protected or unprotected
loss-of-heat-sink events when the power is at or near decay
heat levels and fuel temperatures are nearly isothermal. The
period of 24 hours is based on a reasonable time to manually
scram the reactor and/or to establish auxiliary cooling. Fuel
failure tests of this duration complemented the TREAT tests
(discussed later) by extending cladding failure data into lower
temperature regimes. These data are particularly important
for HT9 clad metallic fuel pins, because the ferrite-to-
austenite phase change at ~1,175 K precludes the extrapola-
tion of high-temperature TREAT test results. The whole pin
furnace tests were also designed to complement the FBTA
eutectic penetration rate tests by investigating cladding fail-
ure at burnups where the plenum pressure is sufficient to
rupture the cladding by itself or in conjunction with simulta-
neous wall thinning by eutectic penetration.
In the whole pin furnace tests, single, whole, EBR-II-
irradiated fuel pins were heated in a radiant heater system.
The furnace was capable of establishing a suitable axial
temperature profile along the cladding length. Test parame-
ters were peak cladding temperature (in the 975e1,225 K
range), burnup, and different fuel-cladding material combi-
nations. Most of the tests resulted in cladding failure as ex-
pected to occur in the range from a fewminutes to hours. The
tests typically used a ramp-and-hold temperature history
with a fixed ramp to temperature followed by a hold at tem-
perature until failure is detected. Some tests were stopped
short of failure to better understand the condition of the pins
prior to failure. Posttest examination involved cladding strain
measurements and posttest metallography.
The computer-controlled radiant heating system was also
able to simulate various loss of decay heat removal conditions
during which the fuel heats gradually over a period of 24e36
hours, and considerable eutectic formation between the fuel
and cladding materials can be expected. In-pin fuel motion,
cladding failure times, and postfailure fuel motion are
important issues under such conditions. The configuration of
the furnace test facility was able to address the first two of
these issues through a series of tests that were terminated at
failure and at selected times prior to failure.
5.3. TREAT metal fuel tests
A series of pin-disruptive tests with metal alloy fuels were
conducted during the Integral Fast Reactor program in
Argonne's TREAT facility using flowing sodium loops [11e15].
Beginning in 1985, six experiments were performed with
irradiated EBR-II metal fuel, designed to provide data per-
taining to anticipated over-power transient without-scram
conditions (UTOP). The objective was to study the behavior
of fuel and cladding near the cladding failure threshold, for arange of burnup and fuel-cladding combinations. Achieving
this objective required, for some fuel pins, stopping the power
transient at the brink of failure and, for other pins, stopping
the transient immediately after failure. Specific goals for the
tests also included accurately measuring the time-dependent
prefailure axial growth of the fuel slugs using a hodoscope
system designed to collimate and detect fast neutrons born by
fissions in the test fuel.
The sodium loop used in TREAT tests was a thick-walled
stainless steel pipe through which liquid sodium is circu-
lated. The first three tests (M2, M3, and M4) each accommo-
dated three EBR-II driver pins that contained Ue5% Fs fuel in
stainless steel cladding. In subsequent tests (M5, M6, and M7),
UePueZr and UeZr reference metal alloy fuels were studied,
but only two pins per test could be accommodated because of
their larger cladding diameter. In all six tests, each pin was
located in a separate stainless steel flow tube with lateral
separation of the pins as wide as possible in order tomaximize
the hodoscope's ability to distinguish the fuel in one pin from
that in another, and tominimize the azimuthal power gradient
in the test fuel due to neutron shielding of one fuel pin by
another. The cross section view of the test trains is shown in
Fig. 7. Coolant temperatures at the outlet and along the fuel
zone were measured using thermocouples attached to the
outer surface of each thin flow tube. The flow tubes remained
intact in all five instances in which fuel pins failed, except in
one case (M7) in which sodium was found outside the flow
tubes but the flow tube breach was scarcely detectable.
All test fuel pins in the M series were subjected to similar
over-power conditions: full coolant flow and an exponential
power rise on an 8-second period as the slowest possible
transient within the energy deposition limitations of the
TREAT reactor. Baseline thermal conditions in the test fuel
were referenced to nominal operating conditions in EBR-II
(peak linear power rating of 40 kW/m, an inlet temperature
of 630 K, and a 150 K coolant temperature rise). The power rise
was rapidly terminated upon detection of cladding breach or
just prior to failure. Out of 15 metal fuel pins tested in six
TREAT tests, five were overheated to cladding breach. In every
case, the cladding breach occurred near the top of the fuel
slug. Over-power levels achieved in each case were about four
times the nominal power. A summary of peak over-power
conditions and fuel performance results achieved in the test
series is given in Table 2.
The high thermal conductivity of metal fuel assures peak
cladding temperatures, hence likely failure sites, near the top
of the fuel column. Temperatures key to the failure threshold
analysis (pin plenum, peak cladding midwall, and cladding
inner-surface temperatures) are close to or easily correlated to
the measured whole-pin coolant temperature rise. The rate of
this temperature rise is sufficiently rapid that, except at the
highest possible burnups, failure would not be expected until
the temperature of the fuel cladding interface exceeds a
threshold value of 1,350 K corresponding to the temperature
at which eutectic penetration into the cladding becomes very
rapid.
The calculations for cladding failure predict that nearly
total eutectic penetration would be required to fail cladding at
low burnup, partial penetration would be required at mid-
range burnups, and almost no penetration would be required
Fig. 7 e Two-pin and three-pin test train cross sections used in Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) metal fuel tests.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 2 7e2 3 9 237at high burnup. At the heating rates of these TREAT tests, the
margin to failure was not expected to depend strongly on the
particular metal fuel or cladding type. In all but the three
highest burnup pins, eutectic penetration plays amajor role in
computed cladding damage. With the noticeable exception of
the single UeZr pin, observed cladding failures were in
reasonable agreement with pretest predictions. Melt fraction
profiles from the posttest examinations for the unfailed pins
reveal melting of approximately one-half of the total fuel in-
ventory encompassing > 90% of the pin cross section near the
fuel top.
The survival of the UeZr pin tested to about 4.8 times
nominal power was unexpected because computed tempera-
tures far exceeded the expected threshold (1,350 K) for rapid
eutectic melt penetration. To obtain the expected relationship
for melt penetration, it is necessary that a molten phase rich
in uranium be in contact with the cladding. It is possible that
the high solidus temperature (~1,500 K) of binary fuel pre-
vented or delayed the onset of this condition necessary for
rapid melt penetration with HT9 cladding.
The measurements of peak prefailure elongation made by
the fast neutron hodoscope for each test pin vary between 2%Table 2 e Peak over-power conditions and metal fuel performa
Fuel/cladding Axial peak
burnup (at.%)
Normalize
over-po
Ue5%Fs/316 SS Fresh 3.8
0.3 4.1
0.3 4.1
2.4 4.1 (fail
4.4 4.2 (fail
4.4 4.0
4.4 3.8
7.9 4.1 (fail
7.9 3.4
Ue19%Pue10%Zr/D9 steel 0.8 4.3
1.9 4.3
1.9 4.4
5.3 4.4 (fail
9.8 4.0 (fail
Ue10%Zr/HT9 2.9 4.8
TREAT, Transient Reactor Test Facility.and 20%, significantly beyond an approximate 1% attribut-
able to pure thermal expansion. In most cases, the peak
expansion persisted during cooldown and was evident in
posttest examinations. Measured expansions of irradiated
EBR-II driver fuel showed strong dependence on burnup and
were especially large at low burnup. By contrast, expansion
of the oxide fuel is typically less and does not show large
burnup dependence. In irradiated fuel, the underlying
mechanism is believed to be the expansion of fission gas that
is initially confined within solid fuel but freed to expand
when fuel approaches its melting point and the fuel matrix
softens.
When cladding failed, postfailure events were character-
ized by rapid fuel dispersal, a sudden but temporary reversal
of inlet coolant flow, and rapid coolant voiding. Different fuel
types tested behaved similarly. Pressure spikes were minor (<
2 MPa) and were correlated to the plenum pressure of the
failed pin. In each case, about half of themolten fuel inventory
was ejected through a small breach at or near the top of the
fuel column. Quantitatively, the amount of disruption
observed seemed correlated to the amount of pin depressur-
ization following failure, driven either by expansion ofnce in TREAT tests.
d peak
wer
Peak pressure (MPa) Maximum axial
expansion (%)
0.6 4
0.6e0.8 16
0.6e0.8 18
ed) 2e6 7
ed) 7e9 Unclear
7e9 4
7e9 4
ed) 17e20 3
17e23 4
1 1
3 3
3 5
ed) 10 4
ed) 19 2
6 3
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 2 7e2 3 9238trapped fission gas or sudden boiling of the liquid sodium
bond within the fuel.
5.4. Molten metal fuel quench tests
The breakup of jets and drops of molten metals in various
liquids other than uranium alloys in sodium are historically
studied on a gram scale. A test series was therefore carried out
to study the breakup and interaction behavior of kilogram
quantities of U alloys in sodium. In addition, data on heat
transfer, solidification, and impingement heat flux were
obtained.
The molten fuel quench tests were conducted in the
apparatus that consisted of a furnace/injector for melting the
pour stream metals, an interaction vessel containing sodium,
and an overall containment vessel [16]. The uranium metals
were melted inductively with a 30-kW 10,000-Hz generator. A
ZrO plug was removed pneumatically from a MgO crucible to
initiate the downward pour of the fuel melt. The sodium was
contained in heated interaction vessels of variable lengthwith
argon cover gas. The instrumentation for indicating condi-
tions in the interaction vessel consisted of a bundle of ther-
mocouples, sodium level indicators of the spark plug type, and
a pressure transducer.
No vapor explosions resulted from these interactions
because the conditions of the pour stream and sodium were
far from satisfying vapor explosion criteria [17]. The quenched
particulate material was primarily in the form of filaments
and sheets. Particle size decreased with increased duration of
the hydrodynamic action on the pour stream prior to freezing.
The largest particles were obtained from the tests with low
melt temperature and, in the test with high injection velocity
of 10m/s, the pour streamwas dispersed into smaller particles
(with a mean size of 0.6 mm) and a lower void fraction than
the low-velocity tests in which the pour stream was acceler-
ated by gravity to ~2 m/s. Size distributions of particles and
mean particle sizes were measured after each test.
It was evident from calculations based on typical bed
conditions observed in these tests that the debris from a
meltdown of a metal-fuel pool reactor would be largely cool-
able by conduction alone without considering enhanced heat
removable by convection. For 10% porosity and no stainless
steel in the bed, 1% decay heat (0.145 MW/kg thermal full
power) could be removed by conduction in bed depths up to
~0.12 m before boiling is initiated. Several correlations for the
maximum boiling heat flux before dryout of deep beds were
compared for a representative particle size of 10 mm, and all
consistently showed that, for 0.9 voidage, bed depths are
significantly high. Even for a bed with 50% porosity, the entire
core with no stainless steel (0.3 m depth) at the bottom
spherical surface of a reactor with a 6 m radius would be
coolable. It was concluded from this study on metal fuel pour
stream breakup and coolability that in-vessel retention would
be the likely outcome.6. Conclusion
A survey of metallic fuel safety performance characteristics is
presented along with a summary of experiments from labo-ratory and in-pile tests. A characteristic of the metal fuel that
inhibited the early development of high burnup pins is the
extensive fuel swelling early in life. Later on, a more complete
understanding of the nature of this swelling led to higher
burnup performance when enough volume was included to
allow the fuel to reach the state where significant inter-
connected porosity developed allowing fission gas release to
the plenum. This eliminated FCMI, and the fission gas pres-
sure in pin plenumdetermined the cladding loading. A unique
aspect of the metal fuel pins, by contrast, is the formation of a
lowmelting point eutectic intermetallic between the uranium
and iron at the fuel-cladding interface. If transient tempera-
tures are sufficiently high for an extended period, the poten-
tial exists for a thinning of the cladding and subsequent
breach. To develop significant cladding thinning, an abun-
dance of molten fuel is required to drive the reaction. When
zirconium is used as a component in the metal fuel alloy, this
eutectic penetration is delayed and reduced. The zirconium
raises the eutectic temperature and provides a protective re-
gion that reduces the migration of uranium to the cladding
surface.
One of the major characteristics of metal alloy fuels is the
high thermal conductivity. The metal fuels have thermal
conductivity almost an order of magnitude greater than the
oxide fuels. When combined with the use of a sodium bond to
improve gap conductivity during early life, this leads to sig-
nificant differences in the radial and axial temperature pro-
files within the metal and oxide fuel pins. The radial
temperature profile is significantly flatter in metallic fuels,
and the temperature drop across the fuel-cladding gap is
negligible. Although the melting point of the metal alloys is
relatively low, the good heat transfer keeps the temperatures
well below melting during normal operation, by about the
same margin for oxide fuel.
A final characteristic important for the safety perfor-
mance of metal fuels is the axial thermal profile. Because of
the high thermal conductivity and gap conductance, the
location of the maximum fuel temperature for metal fuels in
steady operation and in most transients is well above the
axial midplane. This biases the failure locations toward the
top of the fuel column, where the cladding is generally the
weakest and the reactivity effects due to molten fuel relo-
cation are consistently negative. In many transient sce-
narios, propagation of fuel melting through the top of the
fuel slug leads its extrusion into the pin plenum (above the
active core) prior to cladding breach. This in-pin fuel motion
introduces a substantial negative reactivity, producing a
strong shutdown effect and allowing a clean recovery from
severe accident initiators. If the cladding fails, the internal
fission gas pressure forces the molten fuel into the coolant
channel, and the upward ex-pin molten fuel motion
also reduces the core reactivity, allowing to avoid
recriticalities.
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